Latest substantive UPC decisions

• This order is part of the ongoing standard essential patent (SEP) licensing dispute between the parties. For more information about the dispute and previous decisions, see our Insight here.
• Amazon had filed an application pursuant to Rule 115 RoP to request access to the audio recording of the first instance oral hearing at the premises of the Düsseldorf LD. In the application, Amazon specified that they should be permitted to take notes of the audio recording with the assistance of a professional transcriber. InterDigital deferred to the court on the question of whether a professional transcriber should be permitted.
• By an order of 27 November 2025, the judge-rapporteur granted the request to listen to the audio recording, however, the request to produce a complete transcript with the help of a stenographer was rejected.
• Amazon filed a request for review pursuant to Rule 333 RoP. The panel rejected the application but granted permission to appeal. The Court of Appeal granted Amazon’s appeal.
• The Court of Appeal stated that:
  
  • Rule 115 RoP does not prohibit the parties and their representatives from producing a private transcript of the recording they listened to.
  • Rule 115 RoP contains a restriction that the audio recording of the oral hearing shall not be made available for the public or third parties. However, those entitled to access the audio recording are permitted to bring an assistant or support staff, such as a secretary or professional stenographer. The assistant or support staff may produce a private transcript of the audio recording in the presence and under the supervision of the party and/or its representative.
• The Court of Appeal confirmed that it is “not responsible for the transcripts produced by the parties and their representatives. If a private transcript is e.g. incomplete or even false, contains errors, takes specific phrases out of context, or if the private transcript violates the personal rights of persons involved in the proceedings, only the party and its representative is responsible.”
• It also confirmed that using private transcripts in ongoing or parallel proceedings before the UPC is acceptable. The private transcripts may be used for internal preparation by the parties and their representative, as well as in UPC proceedings, for example, by submission as an appendix or evidence of what was said at the oral hearing.
• Moreover, the Court of Appeal confirmed that using the private transcript of an oral hearing in court proceedings between the parties outside of the UPC is also permissible, provided that conditions are met: “[w]hen using a private transcript, it must expressly and clearly state that it is a transcript prepared privately by a party, and not a Court document or one authorised by the Court, and that ultimately (only) the audio recording provides proof of what was said in the oral hearing. It must also be expressly and clearly stated whether it is a complete transcription. Furthermore, it must be expressly and clearly stated that statements made by the Court during an oral hearing are provisional and that the Court’s final opinion is set out only in decisions and orders. These statements serve to avert the risk of misunderstandings arising in court proceedings outside the UPC regarding the value and significance of a private transcript.”
• If private transcripts are used in court proceedings outside of the UPC, the party and its representative must comply with any confidentiality order under Rule 262A or 262 RoP, as well as the protection of personal data under the General Data Protection Regulation.

• Sanofi and Regeneron brought revocation proceedings against Amgen’s patent in issue before the Munich CD. The Munich CD revoked the patent; however, the Court of Appeal overturned that decision. Sanofi and Regeneron applied for a rehearing. Later, Sanofi and Regeneron sought to withdraw their application for a rehearing, which Amgen consented to, and applied for reimbursement of 50% of the court fees. The Court of Appeal permitted the withdrawal of the application, but made no decision on costs as none of the parties requested it. The court rejected Sanofi and Regeneron’s application for reimbursement of court fees as there was no reason for reimbursement under Rule 370.9(b) RoP.

• Following the first instance decision of the Düsseldorf LD, Sanofi and Regeneron lodged an appeal. Sanofi and Regeneron applied to withdraw their appeal, to which Amgen consented, and applied for reimbursement of 50% of the court fees or an amount the court deemed appropriate. The Court of Appeal gave permission to withdraw the appeal and proceedings were closed. There was no costs decision because none of the parties requested it and Regeneron and Sanofi’s request for reimbursement of the court fees was dismissed as the court had no discretion to grant reimbursement (beyond the situations provided for in Rules 370.9 and 370.10 RoP, which were not applicable here).
• The decision relating to Amgen's request to withdraw its counterclaim for revocation and reimbursement of court fees is available in full here.

• The President of the Court of First Instance granted HyGear’s application to change the language of evidence preservation proceedings before the Düsseldorf LD to the language in which the patent was granted (from German to English) under Rule 323 RoP. The proceedings concern a patent relating to hydrogen production by steam methane reforming and were brought by Topsoe against HyGear and others.
• Applying the Court of Appeal's established framework, the President weighed all relevant circumstances and found that HyGear, Topsoe, and Hy-Gear's co-defendant in the main proceedings SYPOX all used English as a working language and that virtually all of the evidence submitted was in English. The Technical University of Munich opposed the application but identified no specific disadvantage it would suffer from the change, so its objection was given limited weight. The application was granted accordingly.

• The Court of Appeal rejected EOFlow's appeal against the Milan CD's dismissal of confidentiality requests under Rule 262.2 RoP. It held that, in the absence of an express confidentiality order, business information that EOFlow had disclosed to Insulet under an obligation to render accounts was not subject to any implicit restriction and had therefore ceased to be confidential.      
• EOFlow, a South Korean manufacturer of insulin pumps, had been found to have infringed Insulet's patent. The Milan CD ordered EOFlow to provide Insulet with complete information on the extent of its infringing acts. It rejected EOFlow's subsequent application for confidentiality under Rule 262.2 RoP.
• EOFlow appealed against the rejection of the confidentiality request. It argued that the information it had disclosed – such as contractual arrangements, invoices, packaging lists, turnover numbers, prices and emails from business partners – was classical business information and not publicly accessible. Provision of the information to Insulet under an obligation to render accounts did not mean it had become public, as Insulet was only permitted to use it for the purposes of pursuing its infringement claims. There was an implicit procedural limitation to its use.
• The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It rejected EOFlow's argument that there was an implicit procedural limitation on the use of the information. It stated that only an order under Rule 262A RoP allows the court to restrict the use of confidential information by the other party. Where information has been disclosed without an order under Rule 262A RoP, or another restriction, it will generally no longer be considered a trade secret or confidential information.  
• In EOFlow's case, as Insulet had received the information in question without any restriction (whether an order under Rule 262A, an agreement between the parties or a voluntary undertaking), the Court of Appeal held that the information was longer a trade secret or other confidential information. It noted that the same did not apply to the information relating to a settlement agreement with EOFlow's exclusive distributor, Menarini, which Insulet agreed should be dealt with confidentially.

• On 7 January 2026, the defendants (a group of companies collectively referred to as GC Aesthetics) filed a request for security of costs under Rule 158 RoP in consolidated infringement and revocation proceedings. The panel ordered Establishment Labs to provide security for costs of EUR 600,000 within 21 days.
• With reference to Article 69(4) UPCA, Rule 159 RoP and relevant case law, the defendants relied on two thresholds. Firstly, the likelihood that enforcement of a UPC order in Costa Rica, where Establishment Labs is incorporated, would be unduly burdensome. They noted that there is no precedent for enforcement of a UPC costs order in Costa Rica. Secondly, the legitimate concerns that any future costs order in their favour may not be recoverable. If one of these thresholds is met, then the court may, at its discretion, order security. The panel confirmed, following the Court of Appeal in Syntorr v Arthex, that each threshold must be assessed independently. Combined consideration of the two thresholds is insufficient if one of the thresholds has not been met.
• On the first threshold, expert evidence established that Costa Rica operates a two-stage process for recognising and enforcing foreign judicial decisions. The panel held that, when arguing that recognition and enforcement proceedings are "unduly burdensome" by reference to their duration, the applicant must supply a standard or reference against which to measure whether that duration is excessive. The panel noted that a recognition stage is common in non-EU/EEA states, and that even within the EU the enforcement stage is governed by national law. As the defendants had not provided a comparator, the panel held that they had failed to establish that enforcement in Costa Rica was unduly burdensome, and the request based on that threshold was therefore denied.
• On the second threshold, the court held that the ratio behind this provision is the protection of a defendant against a claimant who initiates an action without having sufficient means to compensate the defendant for the legal costs incurred. In assessing whether the claimant has “sufficient means”, the court should consider the facts and circumstances of the claimant’s actual financial situation. However, the panel held that the duration of Costa Rican enforcement proceedings could be considered a relevant factor when assessing whether Establishment Labs’ financial position gave rise to a legitimate concern that a future costs order would be unrecoverable at the point of enforcement. On the financial threshold the panel found that the legitimate concern was established and security was therefore granted.
• On quantum, the panel confirmed that costs likely to be incurred in connection with the counterclaim for revocation should be included in the calculation, given that there was no indication that the defendants would have brought a standalone revocation action had they not been sued for infringement. Applying the UPC's guidelines on recoverable costs, the panel set the combined action value of €20,000,000 and the applicable ceiling for recoverable costs was set at €1,200,000. The panel then exercised its discretion and set the security at 50% of that ceiling, by reference to the Court of Appeal's approach in Suinno Mobile v Microsoft.

• TRUMPF is the proprietor of a patent relating to a method and arrangement for generating a laser beam with varying beam profile characteristics using a multi-clad fibre. TRUMPF brought an infringement claim against IPG, which filed a revocation counterclaim.
• The Düsseldorf LD found that IPG directly infringed claim 2 and indirectly infringed claim 1 of the patent. Notably, in respect of indirect infringement of claim 1, the contested embodiment was specifically advertised as being for the purpose of carrying out the method claimed in claim 1 and therefore IPG was aware that the contested embodiment was suitable and intended for use in connection with the invention. The infringing products were fibre lasers from IPG’s “YLS-AMB” series, also referred to as “dual-beam lasers”.
• The counterclaim for revocation, which challenged claims 1 to 3 on grounds of novelty and inventive step, was dismissed in its entirety.
• On claim interpretation, the court rejected IPG’s argument for a restrictive interpretation of the patent.
• In considering inventive step, the court applied the framework set out by the Court of Appeal in Meril v Edwards and Amgen v Sanofi, which requires identification of the objective technical problem from the perspective of the skilled person. The court held that the objective purpose of the patent was to provide a method for generating a laser beam with different beam profile characteristics. Starting from two different realistic starting points, no lack of inventive step was found. The court ruled out two other documents as realistic starting points for the inventive step analysis.
• The court granted an injunction for both direct and indirect infringement. However, it confirmed that remedies like recall, removal from trade and destruction are reserved for products that are the “subject-matter of the patent” and thus are confined to situations of direct infringe.
• Under Rule 119 RoP, the court awarded TRUMPF €115,000 as provisional damages. It also awarded €115,000 as provisional reimbursement of costs under Rule 150.2 RoP.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

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• Sun Patent brought two infringement actions against Vivo before the Paris LD, seeking a finding of infringement of two standard essential patents (SEPs), a determination that the licence terms it proposed were FRAND and, conditionally, an injunction.
• Vivo filed a preliminary objection under Rule 19 RoP in each set of proceedings, arguing that an independent claim for determination of a FRAND rate did not fall within the exclusive competence of the UPC under Article 32(1) UPCA, nor did it fall within the exclusive competence of the Paris LD under Article 33(1) UPCA. The Paris LD rejected the preliminary objection, deferring the admissibility of the FRAND determination claim to the main proceedings, but granted leave to appeal.
• On appeal, Vivo argued that the Paris LD was wrong in exercising its discretion and by deferring the jurisdictional question in accordance with Rule 20.1 RoP: only the judge-rapporteur, not the panel, may defer a preliminary objection to the main proceedings under Rule 20.2 RoP. It also alleged that the Paris LD had mischaracterised the FRAND determination claim as it was not incidental to infringement but a separate and independent request for a binding res judicata declaration of FRAND licence terms for which the UPC lacks jurisdiction.
• The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that the decision to defer a preliminary objection to the main proceedings could be taken by either the judge-rapporteur, as set out in Rule 20.2 RoP, or by the panel if the judge-rapporteur has decided to refer it to the panel for a decision – the judge-rapporteur may refer any matter to the panel for a decision under Rule 102.1 RoP, which applies equally to the interim procedure and the written procedure.
• In considering whether the Paris LD overstepped the boundaries of its discretion, the Court of Appeal concluded that it had not and that there were sound reasons of case management efficiency for the FRAND determination claim to be dealt with in the main proceedings. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Paris LD that Sun Patent’s main claim was primarily an infringement action and that the FRAND determination was incidental or dependent on the infringement question rather than a freestanding claim.
• Vivo had failed to demonstrate that the FRAND determination would need to be decided even if the court were to conclude that there was no infringement. This finding was reinforced by the express wording of Sun Patent’s statement of claim, which presented the FRAND determination as “a condition of the granting of remedies”.
• In any event, the Court of Appeal noted, as had been pointed out by the Paris LD, that all facts and arguments relevant to the determination of FRAND terms, whether admissible or not, would have to be debated by Vivo in its  FRAND defence filed in its statements of defence, which would have to be dealt with in the main proceedings.

• This decision concerned an appeal brought by Ecovacs concerning its application for review of an ex parte order for inspection and preservation of evidence.
• Ecovacs had applied to the Düsseldorf LD for an order for inspection and preservation of evidence at Roborock’s trade fair stand. The Düsseldorf LD granted the order ex parte on the basis that there was a demonstratable risk of evidence being destroyed, removed or altered by means of a software update. The inspection was subsequently carried out on 7 September 2025 with an expert report submitted on 15 October 2025.
• Following the inspection, Roborock requested a review of the order. The Düsseldorf LD revoked the order, finding that Ecovacs had disregarded its duty under Rule 192.3 RoP to present the facts completely and correctly when applying for the order. Ecovacs had represented that the trade fair offered the sole opportunity to determine whether Roborock was active on the European market and directly offering or distributing the contested products to German customers. However, Ecovacs had failed to disclose that Roborock was already directly offering and selling the contested products to German customers via Amazon Germany. This was apparent from Ecovacs' statement of claim in the parallel main proceedings, filed within hours of the evidence preservation application, but the information had not been included Ecovacs’ evidence preservation application itself and therefore the Düsseldorf LD had not been aware of the fact.
• The Court of Appeal dismissed Ecovac’s appeal, upholding the Düsseldorf LD’s revocation of the order in its entirety. The Court of Appeal confirmed that Rule 192.3 RoP imposes a heightened disclosure obligation on applicants for ex parte evidence preservation orders. Applicants must disclose, and not leave out, any material facts that might be relevant for the court’s assessment, including facts relevant for the proportionality assessment. The court characterised Ecovacs’ statements not as “mere clerical errors or details of an insignificant nature”, but as "omissions and distorted accounts of material facts" that were of central importance for the Düsseldorf LD's assessment of whether to allow the request at all.
• The Court of Appeal also rejected Ecovacs’ suggestion that a referral should be made to the CJEU to clarify the scope of “relevant evidence” obtainable under Article 7 of the enforcement directive, finding the suggestion irrelevant as the real issue was Ecovacs’ duty of disclosure under Rule 192.3 RoP.

• This decision of the standing judge of the Court of Appeal relates to a request for discretionary review under Rule 220.3 RoP, brought by Angelalign in relation to a judgment by the Düsseldorf LD.
• Angelalign had applied for provisional measures against Align, who had filed an objection. Angelalign were given until 13 February 2026 to provide a written response to this objection. On 13 February 2026, Angelalign filed a response. However, on 20 February 2026, the court invited them to review their submission as it appeared to be a submission relating to a different case.
• Later that day, Angelalign filed another reply and stated that, while their reply was ready for filing on 13 February 2026, the wrong document had been filed as a result of human error. Pursuant to Rule 9.3(a) RoP, Angelalign requested that the deadline for filing their reply be retrospectively extended to 20 February 2026 and subsequent deadlines be correspondingly extended by one week.
• Align requested that the Düsseldorf LD reject this retrospective extension and declare Angelalign’s amended reply inadmissible. However, the court rejected this request.
• Accordingly, Align sought discretionary review by the Court of Appeal, requesting that it reverse the Düsseldorf LD’s decision to retrospectively extend the deadline. It argued that different LDs had taken diverging approaches when considering whether to grant extension requests filed after the expiry of the time limit.
• In addition, Align argued that the decision was manifestly erroneous because it was based on Rule 9.3(a) RoP when only Rule 320 RoP (re-establishment of rights) should have been applicable in the circumstances. This meant that Angelalign was able to circumvent the strict requirements of Rule 320 RoP. Align also submitted that the Düsseldorf LD had exceeded its discretionary powers and created a gross procedural imbalance between the parties in view of parallel proceedings.
• The standing judge found that Align’s request for discretionary review was admissible, but it dismissed it. The Düsseldorf LD’s decision was not manifestly incorrect - it had correctly applied Rule 9.3(a) RoP rather than Rule 320 RoP. Rule 320 RoP only relates to situations in which a party loses a substantive right because of missing a time limit, for example, if a time limit is missed that relates to completely new proceedings. Failure to meet a time period for submitting a written statement in ongoing proceedings does not result in such a loss of rights. As such, the situation was properly governed by Rule 9.3(a) RoP.
• Rule 9.3(a) RoP does not specify a particular time limit for submitting a request, which leaves room for interpretation by the LDs. The standing judge found that the Düsseldorf LD’s decision had not been “manifestly incorrect”. It had not exceeded its discretionary powers – it had taken into account all of the circumstances and it did not base its decision on false facts.

• Advanced Brain Monitoring (ABM), a US company focusing on neuro-diagnostics devices, brought an infringement action against Koninklijke Philips and related entities before The Hague LD. ABM alleged that Philips' NightBalance sleep position therapy device infringed its patent, which covered wearable systems for treating sleep disorders using position therapy. Philips filed a successful counterclaim for revocation.
• On claim construction, the court applied the Court of Appeal's principles from NanoString v 10x Genomics, confirming that the patent claim is not only the starting point, but the decisive basis for determining protective scope of the patent. The description and drawings must be used as explanatory aids for the interpretation of the patent claim and not only to resolve ambiguities. However, this does not mean that the claims serve as only a guideline and that the description and drawings are able to extend the claim beyond its wording. Here, the court construed the key claim features broadly and rejected ABM's attempts to read additional technical requirements into the claim language.
• On the basis of this broad construction, the court held that claim 1 was anticipated by embodiment 1 of a Japanese patent application and therefore lacked novelty. None of the dependent claims could render the patent valid.
• ABM had filed an auxiliary request limiting feature 1.2 of claim 1 to render the claim novel over the Japanese patent application. While it did overcome the novelty challenge, the court found that the amended claim was obvious starting from the Japanese patent application because the mercury switch used in the Japanese patent application was a hazardous substance that was prohibited in the EU from 1 July 2006 and the skilled person at the priority date would have been compelled to find an alternative. The alternative used in the amended claim was held to be well-established common general knowledge for use in wearable devices at the priority date, which rendered the amended claim obvious.
• The patent was revoked in its entirety. ABM’s infringement action was dismissed. The parties agreed a decision on costs – ABM was to pay Philips €39,000 in each the infringement action and the revocation counterclaim – which the court endorsed.

• This decision concerned a revocation action brought by TCL against Corning, an international manufacturer of specialty glass, regarding Corning’s patent concerning boroalumino silicate glass. TCL claimed invalidity on the basis of lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, insufficient disclosure and added matter
• On claim construction, the Munich CD applied the principles set out by the Court of Appeal in Nanostring v 10x Genomics and Insulet v EOFlow. In doing so, it held that the skilled person, reading the claim as a whole, would understand the various features of claim 1 to be interdependent. Based on expert evidence from both parties, the court considered it to be part of the common general knowledge that in glass systems like the one produced by the claimed method, the individual components are interdependent and the effects of adding or removing components or changing concentrations are often non-linear.
• In considering added matter, the court noted that the application as filed did not contain the exact wording of feature 1.4, but literal support is not required to satisfy Article 138(1)(c) EPC. It is sufficient if the skilled person can, directly and unambiguously, using their common general knowledge, derive the subject matter of the claim from the application as a whole. Applying this standard, all of the features of claim 1 were found to have basis in the application as filed and there was no added matter.
• On sufficiency of disclosure, the court applied the framework from the Court of Appeal in Amgen v Sanofi – is the skilled person able to reproduce the claimed subject matter on the basis of the patent without any inventive effort and without undue burden. An invention is sufficiently disclosed if the patent specification shows the skilled person at least one way – or in the case of functional features: one technical concept – of performing the claimed invention. TCL had argued that the invention was not sufficiently disclosed over the whole range of the claimed invention as the invention required a specific range in the viscosity to be performed. The court disagreed with this on the proper construction of the claim and, accordingly, found that the skilled person would be able to reproduce the claimed subject matter without any inventive effort or undue burden.
• The court confirmed the established UPC standard on novelty, citing the Court of Appeal in Mammut v Ortovox: it is decisive whether the subject-matter of the claim with all its features is directly and unambiguously disclosed in the prior art. The Munich CD found the subject matter of the patent to be novel. There was some discussion on the law relating to novelty of numerical ranges. The Munich CD found that, as a general rule, a generic disclosure does not take away the novelty of a specific (combination of) features. In this case, the skilled person would have had to make a considerable number of selections from multiple broadly defined ranges without any teaching in the prior art to justify those selections in order to arrive at the claimed subject matter. As such, there was no direct and unambiguous disclosure of the claimed subject matter in the prior art.
• On inventive step, the court followed the approach from the Court of Appeal in Amgen v Sanofi and Meril v Edwards. In this case, TCL had tried to rely on one specific example in a prior art document but did not provide a justification or explanation as to why the skilled person would proceed from that specific example in insolation. The Munich CD held that a realistic starting point is typically a prior art disclosure as a whole; the selection of a particular example merely because it comes closest to the claimed subject matter in structural terms risks introducing hindsight at the outset of the analysis. Where claim features are interdependent in providing a solution to the objective problem, dividing the objective problem into separate sub-problems and addressing each independently amounts to impermissible hindsight reasoning. The court found that none of the prior art starting points, alone or in combination, rendered the claimed subject matter obvious. The non-linear and unpredictable interdependencies within glass compositions of this type meant that the skilled person would not have arrived at the claimed solution with a reasonable expectation of success.
• The court dismissed the revocation action in its entirety. TCL was ordered to bear Corning’s legal costs.

• TRUMPF is the registered proprietor of a patent concerning an optical apparatus for combining laser light. IPG develops, manufactures and distributes fibre lasers across Europe. TRUMPF brought an infringement action against IPG, in relation to its "YLS-AMB" range of dual-beam fibre lasers. IPG counterclaimed for revocation on the basis of lack of novelty, lack of inventive step and added matter.
• The Mannheim LD found that IPG infringed the patent – the contested embodiments made direct literal use of the teaching of claim 6 of the patent. IPG's revocation counterclaim was dismissed in its entirety.
• On validity, the panel applied the Court of Appeal's established standard on added matter – as set out by the Court of Appeal in Abbott v Sibio and expert v Seoul Viosys. To determine whether there is added matter, it is necessary to ascertain what the skilled person, using their common general knowledge and viewed objectively, would immediately and unambiguously derive from the application as filed. If the patent is a divisional application, this requirement applies to each earlier application. Applying that standard, the panel found that the patent did not extend beyond the original application.
• On novelty, the Mannheim LD followed the Court of Appeal’s approach in Mammut v Ortovox – the decisive factor is whether the subject matter of the claim, with all its features, is directly and unambiguously disclosed in the prior art. Using this approach, two of the claim features were found not to be disclosed in the prior published patent application.
• In considering inventive step, the court applied the Court of Appeal's test from Amgen v Sanofi and Meril v Edwards. It found that the subject matter of the claim involved an inventive step over the primary prior art alone or in combination with other prior art documents or the common general knowledge.
• The court granted TRUMPF injunctive relief across seven UPC member states. It also made orders for recall, removal and destruction, disclosure of information, a declaration of liability for damages, and provisional damages.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• This was an action for infringement of Canon's patent relating to printer consumables against Katun and a counterclaim for revocation. The Dusseldorf LD found the patent valid and infringed and granted an injunction.
• The court also ruled on publication of the decision. Canon sought both the right to publish the decision on its own website and in industry journals of its choice, and an order under Article 80 UPCA obliging Katun to publish the operative part of the decision on their website.
• The Dusseldorf LD stated that the decision whether to permit publication by Canon should depend on a two step-test, citing the Court of Appeal's decision dated 25 November 2025 in Meril v Edwards (paragraphs 199-200). The court asked (1) whether the claimant has a legitimate interest in publication and (2) whether the defendant’s interests outweigh this. It held that both limbs favoured Canon, noting it was necessary to correct the false impression created by Katun's statements on their US website that they were confident their products did not infringe. However, the court held that there should be a restriction on the number of public media outlets in which Canon could publish the decision, agreeing to publication in five industry journals. It also held that publication on Canon's website should be restricted to one month.
• The court also made an order that Katun be required to publish the outcome on their own website, noting their statements expressing confidence that there was no infringement. The court ordered Katun to publish the operative part of the decision stating that infringement had occurred, again for a period of one month.

• In the context of an infringement action brought by Keeex, in December 2025, Adobe obtained an order for security for costs from Keeex. This security was to be given in the form of a bank guarantee from an EU-authorised bank within four weeks and totalled €200,000. Keeex appealed this order under Rule 220.1 RoP, but the appeal had no suspensive effect.
• Adobe subsequently applied for a default judgment under Rule 158.5 and Rule 355.1(a) RoP, seeking dismissal of the infringement action and its costs. It argued that Keeex had failed to provide the ordered bank guarantee within the time limit and that the documents it eventually produced did not comply with the December 2025 order or Rule 158 RoP.
• Keeex argued that default judgment is an exceptional measure that should only be handed down in the event of “manifest, persistent and culpable failure by a party, characterised by a total or deliberate refusal to comply with an order”. It relied on the fact that it (i) sought clarification from the court on the form of security, (ii) filed, within the deadline, a bank certificate showing that €200,000 had been blocked on its account, and (iii) promptly filed a “first demand” bank guarantee after receiving the judge-rapporteur’s clarifications.
• In making its decision, the Paris LD recalled that Rule 158.5 RoP provides that it may render a default judgment and, referring to the Court of Appeal’s approach in Microsoft v Suinno, emphasised the need to exercise that discretion in accordance with fairness, proportionality and procedural efficiency.
• The court held that Keeex had demonstrated sufficient diligence and that Adobe’s objections were largely formal and unsupported by evidence under Rule 271.2 RoP. As such, Adobe's application for default judgment was dismissed.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• This costs decision by the Düsseldorf LD related to costs in the provisional measures proceedings and subsequent infringement proceedings between 10x Genomics and Curio. In the merits decision, the court had found that Curio had infringed 10x Genomics’ patent and ordered that the costs of both the provisional measures proceedings and the main action be borne 30% by 10x Genomics and 70% by Curio. It set the value in dispute at €2,000,000 for the provisional measures proceedings and €3,000,000 for the infringement action.
• 10x Genomics subsequently applied for a cost decision under Article 69 UPCA and Rules 150-152 RoP, arguing that representation costs incurred across the provisional measures and main proceedings should be treated as a single “unit”, such that the ceilings for recoverable representation costs for both proceedings could effectively be added or that some of the provisional measures costs should be treated as “other expenses” in the main action.
• The Düsseldorf LD rejected this approach. Relying on its earlier decision in Ortovox v Mammut, it reiterated that provisional measures proceedings and main proceedings are separate within the meaning of Article 32(1) UPCA and that costs incurred in provisional measures proceedings are reimbursable separately, within their own ceiling. It was therefore inadmissible to mix or shift representation costs between the provisional measures and main proceedings, even if work done in the provisional measures proceedings was later reused. The court emphasised that only reasonable and proportionate costs are recoverable, that the ceiling is an additional safeguard against undue cost recovery that should not, “as a rule”, be reached. Additionally, it noted that the applicant can influence the setting of the ceiling by specifying a value that reflects its “actual interest in the proceedings”.
• Applying these principles, the court held that: (i) all representation costs in the provisional measures proceedings must be capped by the provisional measures ceiling of EUR 200,000, and (ii) representation costs in the main action must be capped by the main action ceiling of EUR 400,000.
• The Düsseldorf LD therefore ordered Curio to reimburse 10x Genomics a total amount (redacted in the public version) calculated on this basis and dismissed the remainder of 10x Genomics’ application for reimbursement of costs. The decision confirms that provisional measures and main proceedings remain distinct for cost‑ceiling purposes and that parties cannot “top up” unused provisional measures ceiling headroom in later merits proceedings.

• At first instance, following inter partes proceedings on Amycel's application for provisional measures against the defendant (identity redacted) before the Hague LD, the court ordered a preliminary injunction. Amycel subsequently brought an infringement action. The Hague LD found that the defendant's representative had not taken all due care to avoid the late filing of its statement of defence, ordering a decision by default under Rule 355 RoP.
• In its decision by default , the Hague LD held the defendant liable for infringement concerning the mushroom strain Cayene, and ordered the defendant to return stock, notify customers of the decision online and make an interim damages payment.
• The defendant/applicant appealed against the Hague LD’s default judgment decision and applied for suspensive effect of the Hague LD’s order to notify customers, publish the decision and to pay interim damages pursuant to Rule 223 RoP. The Court of Appeal rejected the application for suspensive effect as the defendant/applicant failed to establish exceptional circumstances justifying suspension of the orders.
• The defendant/applicant had argued that the publication orders would be impossible to revert, claiming "any information published on the internet will stay there forever". It also asserted that no urgency existed and contended that the interim damages payment would have serious business consequences.
• The Court of Appeal noted that Article 74(1) UPCA provides that appeals have no suspensive effect unless the court decides otherwise, and Rule 223.2 RoP requires applications to set out reasons and supporting evidence. The panel examined whether exceptional circumstances justified departing from this principle, referencing its previous decisions in Suinno v Microsoft and Chint v Jingao, which recognised that exceptions may apply if the decision is manifestly erroneous or the appeal becomes devoid of purpose absent suspension.
• The Court of Appeal held that the defendant/applicant bore the burden of establishing any exceptional circumstances, which it failed to do. Merely claiming irreversibility of the effects of publication of the decision and customer letters was insufficient without establishing the Hague LD’s decision was manifestly erroneous.
• Furthermore, the court held that even if it were to accept that the consequences of the orders were not fully reversible, it did not follow that the appeal would become devoid of purpose in the absence of suspensive effect or that the defendant/applicant's interest in maintaining the status quo until the decision on appeal outweighed Amycel's legitimate interest informing the defendant/applicant’s customers and the public of the decision.
• Regarding interim damages, the Court of Appeal held that bare assertions of "serious consequences" without substantiation could not outweigh Amycel's interest in enforcement.

• Amazon applied to the UPC Court of Appeal seeking suspensive effect of the Mannheim LD’s 22 December review order (limited to the aspects allegedly affecting the “final relief” sought in England). The standing judge of the UPC Court of Appeal rejected the application.
• In refusing the application, the court reiterated that appeals do not usually have suspensive effect under Article 74(1) UPCA and it would only be granted in exceptional circumstances, such as a manifestly erroneous decision or enforcement rendering the appeal devoid of purpose.
• The court held that: (i) Amazon had not shown any manifest error; (ii) the interaction between the English measures and the Mannheim LD’s order raised complex issues unsuitable for a summary suspensive ruling; and (iii) Amazon had not established that it would suffer irreversible harm requiring urgent suspension, especially given the availability of adversarial processes and appellate remedies concerning any penalty proceedings.
• To read more about this decision, see our insight here.