Latest substantive UPC decisions

• The Court of Appeal dismissed an application for discretionary review under Rule 220.3 RoP brought by Adobe. It ruled that an order refusing to reject Keeex's application for provisional damages of €120 million was neither manifestly erroneous nor raised any fundamental question of law.
• The underlying infringement action was brought by Keeex, seeking damages of approximately €5.6 billion for financial harm and €1 billion for non-financial harm.
• At the case management conference, Keeex had agreed to seek determination of damages in a separate procedure under Rule 125 RoP, with the order recording that discussion of the financial stakes in the infringement proceedings would be "limited to any possible interim damages request." This wording was then reflected in Adobe's defence and counterclaim. In its reply, Keeex withdrew its damages claim and instead sought an interim award under Rule 119 RoP of €100 million for financial and €20 million for non-financial harm.
• Adobe applied to the judge-rapporteur to declare the interim damages request inadmissible under Rules 13(k) and 263 RoP, or to order its withdrawal under Rule 9.1 RoP, its exclusion from the merits under Rule 334(f) RoP, or its summary rejection under Rule 334(h) RoP. The judge-rapporteur rejected those applications. The panel of the Paris LD upheld the judge-rapporteur's decision and refused leave to appeal. Adobe then applied for discretionary review under Rule 220.3 RoP.
• In assessing whether to grant discretionary review, the Court of Appeal applied the established test from its own prior case law, including Centripetal v Keysight and Motorola v Ericsson. This requires either that the contested order be manifestly erroneous or that it raises a fundamental question of law necessary to ensure coherent application and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure.
• The court agreed with Keeex that the contested order raised no fundamental question of law, finding that the points raised by Adobe were all linked to the facts of the case and did not bear on the coherent application or interpretation of the Rules of Procedure.
• On the substance, the court addressed each of Adobe's arguments in turn. It was not manifestly erroneous for the Paris LD to find that Keeex's commitment at the case management conference did not constitute a waiver of any financial compensation in the present proceedings. The procedural order had expressly kept open the possibility of an interim damages request, which Adobe had acknowledged in its defence. The fact that the interim claim of €120 million was high in absolute terms did not alter its provisional character or the fact that only a proportion of final damages was being sought. The fact that Keeex referred to the same factual background as the original damages claim to support its application did not transform it into a claim for final damages. Nor was it unreasonable for Keeex to combine the withdrawal of its full damages claim with the introduction of the interim claim in the reply, which was its first submission after the case management conference.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

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• The Court of Appeal dismissed Angelalign's appeal against the Düsseldorf's LD's grant of a preliminary injunction. It held that it was more likely than not that Align's patent was valid and infringed by Angelalign's iOrtho software for planning orthodontic treatment.
• The patent protects software for planning orthodontic treatment in which revised treatment plans are generated in real time. Align applied for and was awarded provisional measures after Angelalign introduced a "LiveNow" feature in its iOrtho software.
• The Court of Appeal addressed two procedural points.
• Firstly, it disregarded two late-filed exhibits relating to an alleged public prior use. Under Rule 222.2 RoP, the Court of Appeal has discretion to disregard requests, facts and evidence that have not been submitted at first instance. Angelalign had not adequately explained why this evidence could not have been filed during the (extended) two-month period for its objection to Align's application or in the three months before the hearing at first instance. It had also not addressed the fact that it had previously filed a similar exhibit in EPO opposition proceedings. Its lack of clarity weighed against allowing the new exhibits. Moreover, the exhibits raised unresolved questions about the prior art software that there was insufficient room to deal with on appeal.
• Secondly, Angelalign's non-infringement arguments, raised for the first time in its rejoinder, were admitted only for one scenario. As decided in Mammut v Ortovox, the Court of Appeal is not bound by the exclusion of exhibits or submissions at first instance. The court noted that, given the summary nature of proceedings for provisional measures and the time periods applicable, there might, in individual cases, be reasons for taking "amore lenient approach" to late filed submissions than applied in a case on the merits. On the other hand, defendants launching products at risk may attract heightened scrutiny. Here, Angelalign had not provided a justification for the late filing of their non-infringement arguments, which related to the functioning of their own products. The arguments were therefore rejected apart from in relation to one scenario, where the technical facts were uncontested by Align. As a general rule, uncontested submissions cannot be rejected on the grounds of late filing, and in this case Align had had ample time to study them.
• On claim construction, novelty and inventive step, the Court of Appeal followed the principles established in its case law. It carried out a detailed review of the novelty and inventive step attacks and, in relation to the former, disagreed with the Düsseldorf LD's finding that a "real time" re-calculation feature was not present in one item of prior art. However, it ultimately rejected the attacks. On the balance of probabilities, based on the arguments and documents in the proceedings, it was more likely than not that the claims would be held valid. Infringement was also established for one scenario on the balance of probabilities.
• The court went on to consider the balance ofinterests, which it concluded favoured upholding the injunction. In particular,the parties are direct competitors. Angelalign's "Live Now" featurewas launched only months before the patent's grant and featured prominently inits marketing. It was not contested that, until Angelalign launched thisfeature, Align was the only provider of treatment planning software with suchlive updates. It was accepted that in the aligner sector, clinicians typicallychoose one provider and remain loyal to them for all their patients. AllowingAngelalign to continue to offer its software with the "Live Now"feature posed a concrete risk to Align's market position that needed to beavoided.

• This case relates to a patent for a swivel-locking device for the wheels of a stroller or buggy. The patentee, Wonderland Nurserygoods, alleged that the defendants had infringed its patent under the doctrine of equivalents. The defendants counterclaimed to revoke the patent. The Düsseldorf LD found the patent valid but not infringed. However, it considered the test to be applied for equivalence, applying thecriteria previously set out by The Hague LD.
• The court applied the established case law of the Court of Appeal to reject the defendants' allegations of added matter, lack of novelty and obviousness.
• For their obviousness attacks, the defendants had relied on a total of 14 supposedly realistic starting points, citing a wide range of documents as potential combinations. Following the approach to inventive step set out by the Court of Appeal in Meril v Edwards and Amgen v Sanofi, there can be more than one realistic starting point. However, the Düsseldorf LD noted that this approach requires several steps to be taken to demonstrate a lack of inventive step. In this case, the defendants had failed properly to assess in their pleadings whether the skilled person, starting froma specific realistic starting point and wishing to solve an objective problem, would (not only could) have arrived at the claimed invention.
• Instead, Wonderland had applied the EPO's problem-solution approach. Further, some of the combinations had simply been mentioned in passing, without any explanation. The court invited Wonderland to select one or more combinations and explain them in more detail at the oral hearing. However, not even these attacks were successful.
• In relation to infringement, the Court of Appeal has yet to rule on the criteria or equivalence to be used in the UPC. Several first instance decisions have considered the issue, but most have found that there was no equivalent function or effect and have not set out a complete test. The exception is the Hague LD, which had carried out a full analysis of equivalence in Plant-e v Arkyne and Washtower v BEGA.
• Under the Hague LD's test, a variant is equivalent if four questions are answered in the affirmative:
  1. Technical equivalence: does the variant solve (essentially) the same problem that the patented invention solves and performs (essentially) the same function in this context?
  2. Is extending the protection of the claim to the equivalent proportionate to a fair protection for the patentee? This needs to be assessed in view of the patentee’s contribution to the art and taking into account the question whether it is obvious to the skilled person from the patent publication how to apply the equivalent element (at the time of infringement).
  3. Reasonable legal certainty for third parties: does the skilled person understand from the patent that the scope of the invention is broader than what is claimed literally?
  4. Is the allegedly infringing product novel and inventive over the prior art?  
• The Düsseldorf LD considered that the Hague LD's criteria to "form a coherent whole and are, as such, suitable for examining patent infringement by equivalent means". There were no grounds for applying a different standard in the present case.  
• On question 1, the court found no technical equivalence. It stated that, while the claim must be considered as a whole, it is necessary to determine the function of each substituted feature in relation to the claim. That allows a comparison between the technical functions of the claimed and substitute means. Therefore, it is "not sufficient to focus solely on the objective task of the patent. Rather, what matters is the function of each exchanged features [sic] inachieving this task". In Wonderland's case, the court considered that it had reduced the entire invention to a secured connection between rotatable and non-rotatable elements, and not sufficiently explained how this was to be achieved according to the patent’s teaching.
• Question 2, on fair protection, was also answered in the negative. The court rejected Wonderland's arguments that it was obvious "to simply reverse" the arrangement of components. To reach the alleged infringement, several parts would have to be rearranged simultaneously. This would amount to a "fundamental redesign", which would not have been obvious to the skilled person. Wonderland had also failed to explain the patent's contribution to the art; the court left this issue open, but noted that nothing could be inferred in Wonderland's favour in that regard.
• Question 3, on reasonable legal certainty, was again answered in the negative. Wonderland's arguments had failed to consider that the claim set out specific requirements for the arrangement of components, and it was precisely this arrangement that achieved the desired secured connection between rotatable and non-rotatable elements. The skilled person would not understand that "such significant modifications in almost all parts" would be covered by the patent.
• Having answered questions 1 to 3 in favour of the defendants, the court did not consider it necessary to consider question 4, whether the infringing products were novel and inventive over the prior art.
• See our Insight here for more details.

• This order is part of the ongoing standard essential patent (SEP) licensing dispute between the parties. For more information about the dispute and previous decisions, see our Insight here.
• Amazon had filed an application pursuant to Rule 115 RoP to request access to the audio recording of the first instance oral hearing at the premises of the Düsseldorf LD. In the application, Amazon specified that they should be permitted to take notes of the audio recording with the assistance of a professional transcriber. InterDigital deferred to the court on the question of whether a professional transcriber should be permitted.
• By an order of 27 November 2025, the judge-rapporteur granted the request to listen to the audio recording, however, the request to produce a complete transcript with the help of a stenographer was rejected.
• Amazon filed a request for review pursuant to Rule 333 RoP. The panel rejected the application but granted permission to appeal. The Court of Appeal granted Amazon’s appeal.
• The Court of Appeal stated that:
  
  • Rule 115 RoP does not prohibit the parties and their representatives from producing a private transcript of the recording they listened to.
  • Rule 115 RoP contains a restriction that the audio recording of the oral hearing shall not be made available for the public or third parties. However, those entitled to access the audio recording are permitted to bring an assistant or support staff, such as a secretary or professional stenographer. The assistant or support staff may produce a private transcript of the audio recording in the presence and under the supervision of the party and/or its representative.
• The Court of Appeal confirmed that it is “not responsible for the transcripts produced by the parties and their representatives. If a private transcript is e.g. incomplete or even false, contains errors, takes specific phrases out of context, or if the private transcript violates the personal rights of persons involved in the proceedings, only the party and its representative is responsible.”
• It also confirmed that using private transcripts in ongoing or parallel proceedings before the UPC is acceptable. The private transcripts may be used for internal preparation by the parties and their representative, as well as in UPC proceedings, for example, by submission as an appendix or evidence of what was said at the oral hearing.
• Moreover, the Court of Appeal confirmed that using the private transcript of an oral hearing in court proceedings between the parties outside of the UPC is also permissible, provided that conditions are met: “[w]hen using a private transcript, it must expressly and clearly state that it is a transcript prepared privately by a party, and not a Court document or one authorised by the Court, and that ultimately (only) the audio recording provides proof of what was said in the oral hearing. It must also be expressly and clearly stated whether it is a complete transcription. Furthermore, it must be expressly and clearly stated that statements made by the Court during an oral hearing are provisional and that the Court’s final opinion is set out only in decisions and orders. These statements serve to avert the risk of misunderstandings arising in court proceedings outside the UPC regarding the value and significance of a private transcript.”
• If private transcripts are used in court proceedings outside of the UPC, the party and its representative must comply with any confidentiality order under Rule 262A or 262 RoP, as well as the protection of personal data under the General Data Protection Regulation.

• Sanofi and Regeneron brought revocation proceedings against Amgen’s patent in issue before the Munich CD. The Munich CD revoked the patent; however, the Court of Appeal overturned that decision. Sanofi and Regeneron applied for a rehearing. Later, Sanofi and Regeneron sought to withdraw their application for a rehearing, which Amgen consented to, and applied for reimbursement of 50% of the court fees. The Court of Appeal permitted the withdrawal of the application, but made no decision on costs as none of the parties requested it. The court rejected Sanofi and Regeneron’s application for reimbursement of court fees as there was no reason for reimbursement under Rule 370.9(b) RoP.

• Following the first instance decision of the Düsseldorf LD, Sanofi and Regeneron lodged an appeal. Sanofi and Regeneron applied to withdraw their appeal, to which Amgen consented, and applied for reimbursement of 50% of the court fees or an amount the court deemed appropriate. The Court of Appeal gave permission to withdraw the appeal and proceedings were closed. There was no costs decision because none of the parties requested it and Regeneron and Sanofi’s request for reimbursement of the court fees was dismissed as the court had no discretion to grant reimbursement (beyond the situations provided for in Rules 370.9 and 370.10 RoP, which were not applicable here).
• The decision relating to Amgen's request to withdraw its counterclaim for revocation and reimbursement of court fees is available in full here.

• The President of the Court of First Instance granted HyGear’s application to change the language of evidence preservation proceedings before the Düsseldorf LD to the language in which the patent was granted (from German to English) under Rule 323 RoP. The proceedings concern a patent relating to hydrogen production by steam methane reforming and were brought by Topsoe against HyGear and others.
• Applying the Court of Appeal's established framework, the President weighed all relevant circumstances and found that HyGear, Topsoe, and Hy-Gear's co-defendant in the main proceedings SYPOX all used English as a working language and that virtually all of the evidence submitted was in English. The Technical University of Munich opposed the application but identified no specific disadvantage it would suffer from the change, so its objection was given limited weight. The application was granted accordingly.

• The Court of Appeal rejected EOFlow's appeal against the Milan CD's dismissal of confidentiality requests under Rule 262.2 RoP. It held that, in the absence of an express confidentiality order, business information that EOFlow had disclosed to Insulet under an obligation to render accounts was not subject to any implicit restriction and had therefore ceased to be confidential.      
• EOFlow, a South Korean manufacturer of insulin pumps, had been found to have infringed Insulet's patent. The Milan CD ordered EOFlow to provide Insulet with complete information on the extent of its infringing acts. It rejected EOFlow's subsequent application for confidentiality under Rule 262.2 RoP.
• EOFlow appealed against the rejection of the confidentiality request. It argued that the information it had disclosed – such as contractual arrangements, invoices, packaging lists, turnover numbers, prices and emails from business partners – was classical business information and not publicly accessible. Provision of the information to Insulet under an obligation to render accounts did not mean it had become public, as Insulet was only permitted to use it for the purposes of pursuing its infringement claims. There was an implicit procedural limitation to its use.
• The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It rejected EOFlow's argument that there was an implicit procedural limitation on the use of the information. It stated that only an order under Rule 262A RoP allows the court to restrict the use of confidential information by the other party. Where information has been disclosed without an order under Rule 262A RoP, or another restriction, it will generally no longer be considered a trade secret or confidential information.  
• In EOFlow's case, as Insulet had received the information in question without any restriction (whether an order under Rule 262A, an agreement between the parties or a voluntary undertaking), the Court of Appeal held that the information was longer a trade secret or other confidential information. It noted that the same did not apply to the information relating to a settlement agreement with EOFlow's exclusive distributor, Menarini, which Insulet agreed should be dealt with confidentially.

• On 7 January 2026, the defendants (a group of companies collectively referred to as GC Aesthetics) filed a request for security of costs under Rule 158 RoP in consolidated infringement and revocation proceedings. The panel ordered Establishment Labs to provide security for costs of EUR 600,000 within 21 days.
• With reference to Article 69(4) UPCA, Rule 159 RoP and relevant case law, the defendants relied on two thresholds. Firstly, the likelihood that enforcement of a UPC order in Costa Rica, where Establishment Labs is incorporated, would be unduly burdensome. They noted that there is no precedent for enforcement of a UPC costs order in Costa Rica. Secondly, the legitimate concerns that any future costs order in their favour may not be recoverable. If one of these thresholds is met, then the court may, at its discretion, order security. The panel confirmed, following the Court of Appeal in Syntorr v Arthex, that each threshold must be assessed independently. Combined consideration of the two thresholds is insufficient if one of the thresholds has not been met.
• On the first threshold, expert evidence established that Costa Rica operates a two-stage process for recognising and enforcing foreign judicial decisions. The panel held that, when arguing that recognition and enforcement proceedings are "unduly burdensome" by reference to their duration, the applicant must supply a standard or reference against which to measure whether that duration is excessive. The panel noted that a recognition stage is common in non-EU/EEA states, and that even within the EU the enforcement stage is governed by national law. As the defendants had not provided a comparator, the panel held that they had failed to establish that enforcement in Costa Rica was unduly burdensome, and the request based on that threshold was therefore denied.
• On the second threshold, the court held that the ratio behind this provision is the protection of a defendant against a claimant who initiates an action without having sufficient means to compensate the defendant for the legal costs incurred. In assessing whether the claimant has “sufficient means”, the court should consider the facts and circumstances of the claimant’s actual financial situation. However, the panel held that the duration of Costa Rican enforcement proceedings could be considered a relevant factor when assessing whether Establishment Labs’ financial position gave rise to a legitimate concern that a future costs order would be unrecoverable at the point of enforcement. On the financial threshold the panel found that the legitimate concern was established and security was therefore granted.
• On quantum, the panel confirmed that costs likely to be incurred in connection with the counterclaim for revocation should be included in the calculation, given that there was no indication that the defendants would have brought a standalone revocation action had they not been sued for infringement. Applying the UPC's guidelines on recoverable costs, the panel set the combined action value of €20,000,000 and the applicable ceiling for recoverable costs was set at €1,200,000. The panel then exercised its discretion and set the security at 50% of that ceiling, by reference to the Court of Appeal's approach in Suinno Mobile v Microsoft.

• TRUMPF is the proprietor of a patent relating to a method and arrangement for generating a laser beam with varying beam profile characteristics using a multi-clad fibre. TRUMPF brought an infringement claim against IPG, which filed a revocation counterclaim.
• The Düsseldorf LD found that IPG directly infringed claim 2 and indirectly infringed claim 1 of the patent. Notably, in respect of indirect infringement of claim 1, the contested embodiment was specifically advertised as being for the purpose of carrying out the method claimed in claim 1 and therefore IPG was aware that the contested embodiment was suitable and intended for use in connection with the invention. The infringing products were fibre lasers from IPG’s “YLS-AMB” series, also referred to as “dual-beam lasers”.
• The counterclaim for revocation, which challenged claims 1 to 3 on grounds of novelty and inventive step, was dismissed in its entirety.
• On claim interpretation, the court rejected IPG’s argument for a restrictive interpretation of the patent.
• In considering inventive step, the court applied the framework set out by the Court of Appeal in Meril v Edwards and Amgen v Sanofi, which requires identification of the objective technical problem from the perspective of the skilled person. The court held that the objective purpose of the patent was to provide a method for generating a laser beam with different beam profile characteristics. Starting from two different realistic starting points, no lack of inventive step was found. The court ruled out two other documents as realistic starting points for the inventive step analysis.
• The court granted an injunction for both direct and indirect infringement. However, it confirmed that remedies like recall, removal from trade and destruction are reserved for products that are the “subject-matter of the patent” and thus are confined to situations of direct infringe.
• Under Rule 119 RoP, the court awarded TRUMPF €115,000 as provisional damages. It also awarded €115,000 as provisional reimbursement of costs under Rule 150.2 RoP.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

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• Sun Patent brought two infringement actions against Vivo before the Paris LD, seeking a finding of infringement of two standard essential patents (SEPs), a determination that the licence terms it proposed were FRAND and, conditionally, an injunction.
• Vivo filed a preliminary objection under Rule 19 RoP in each set of proceedings, arguing that an independent claim for determination of a FRAND rate did not fall within the exclusive competence of the UPC under Article 32(1) UPCA, nor did it fall within the exclusive competence of the Paris LD under Article 33(1) UPCA. The Paris LD rejected the preliminary objection, deferring the admissibility of the FRAND determination claim to the main proceedings, but granted leave to appeal.
• On appeal, Vivo argued that the Paris LD was wrong in exercising its discretion and by deferring the jurisdictional question in accordance with Rule 20.1 RoP: only the judge-rapporteur, not the panel, may defer a preliminary objection to the main proceedings under Rule 20.2 RoP. It also alleged that the Paris LD had mischaracterised the FRAND determination claim as it was not incidental to infringement but a separate and independent request for a binding res judicata declaration of FRAND licence terms for which the UPC lacks jurisdiction.
• The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that the decision to defer a preliminary objection to the main proceedings could be taken by either the judge-rapporteur, as set out in Rule 20.2 RoP, or by the panel if the judge-rapporteur has decided to refer it to the panel for a decision – the judge-rapporteur may refer any matter to the panel for a decision under Rule 102.1 RoP, which applies equally to the interim procedure and the written procedure.
• In considering whether the Paris LD overstepped the boundaries of its discretion, the Court of Appeal concluded that it had not and that there were sound reasons of case management efficiency for the FRAND determination claim to be dealt with in the main proceedings. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Paris LD that Sun Patent’s main claim was primarily an infringement action and that the FRAND determination was incidental or dependent on the infringement question rather than a freestanding claim.
• Vivo had failed to demonstrate that the FRAND determination would need to be decided even if the court were to conclude that there was no infringement. This finding was reinforced by the express wording of Sun Patent’s statement of claim, which presented the FRAND determination as “a condition of the granting of remedies”.
• In any event, the Court of Appeal noted, as had been pointed out by the Paris LD, that all facts and arguments relevant to the determination of FRAND terms, whether admissible or not, would have to be debated by Vivo in its  FRAND defence filed in its statements of defence, which would have to be dealt with in the main proceedings.

• This decision concerned an appeal brought by Ecovacs concerning its application for review of an ex parte order for inspection and preservation of evidence.
• Ecovacs had applied to the Düsseldorf LD for an order for inspection and preservation of evidence at Roborock’s trade fair stand. The Düsseldorf LD granted the order ex parte on the basis that there was a demonstratable risk of evidence being destroyed, removed or altered by means of a software update. The inspection was subsequently carried out on 7 September 2025 with an expert report submitted on 15 October 2025.
• Following the inspection, Roborock requested a review of the order. The Düsseldorf LD revoked the order, finding that Ecovacs had disregarded its duty under Rule 192.3 RoP to present the facts completely and correctly when applying for the order. Ecovacs had represented that the trade fair offered the sole opportunity to determine whether Roborock was active on the European market and directly offering or distributing the contested products to German customers. However, Ecovacs had failed to disclose that Roborock was already directly offering and selling the contested products to German customers via Amazon Germany. This was apparent from Ecovacs' statement of claim in the parallel main proceedings, filed within hours of the evidence preservation application, but the information had not been included Ecovacs’ evidence preservation application itself and therefore the Düsseldorf LD had not been aware of the fact.
• The Court of Appeal dismissed Ecovac’s appeal, upholding the Düsseldorf LD’s revocation of the order in its entirety. The Court of Appeal confirmed that Rule 192.3 RoP imposes a heightened disclosure obligation on applicants for ex parte evidence preservation orders. Applicants must disclose, and not leave out, any material facts that might be relevant for the court’s assessment, including facts relevant for the proportionality assessment. The court characterised Ecovacs’ statements not as “mere clerical errors or details of an insignificant nature”, but as "omissions and distorted accounts of material facts" that were of central importance for the Düsseldorf LD's assessment of whether to allow the request at all.
• The Court of Appeal also rejected Ecovacs’ suggestion that a referral should be made to the CJEU to clarify the scope of “relevant evidence” obtainable under Article 7 of the enforcement directive, finding the suggestion irrelevant as the real issue was Ecovacs’ duty of disclosure under Rule 192.3 RoP.

• This decision of the standing judge of the Court of Appeal relates to a request for discretionary review under Rule 220.3 RoP, brought by Angelalign in relation to a judgment by the Düsseldorf LD.
• Angelalign had applied for provisional measures against Align, who had filed an objection. Angelalign were given until 13 February 2026 to provide a written response to this objection. On 13 February 2026, Angelalign filed a response. However, on 20 February 2026, the court invited them to review their submission as it appeared to be a submission relating to a different case.
• Later that day, Angelalign filed another reply and stated that, while their reply was ready for filing on 13 February 2026, the wrong document had been filed as a result of human error. Pursuant to Rule 9.3(a) RoP, Angelalign requested that the deadline for filing their reply be retrospectively extended to 20 February 2026 and subsequent deadlines be correspondingly extended by one week.
• Align requested that the Düsseldorf LD reject this retrospective extension and declare Angelalign’s amended reply inadmissible. However, the court rejected this request.
• Accordingly, Align sought discretionary review by the Court of Appeal, requesting that it reverse the Düsseldorf LD’s decision to retrospectively extend the deadline. It argued that different LDs had taken diverging approaches when considering whether to grant extension requests filed after the expiry of the time limit.
• In addition, Align argued that the decision was manifestly erroneous because it was based on Rule 9.3(a) RoP when only Rule 320 RoP (re-establishment of rights) should have been applicable in the circumstances. This meant that Angelalign was able to circumvent the strict requirements of Rule 320 RoP. Align also submitted that the Düsseldorf LD had exceeded its discretionary powers and created a gross procedural imbalance between the parties in view of parallel proceedings.
• The standing judge found that Align’s request for discretionary review was admissible, but it dismissed it. The Düsseldorf LD’s decision was not manifestly incorrect - it had correctly applied Rule 9.3(a) RoP rather than Rule 320 RoP. Rule 320 RoP only relates to situations in which a party loses a substantive right because of missing a time limit, for example, if a time limit is missed that relates to completely new proceedings. Failure to meet a time period for submitting a written statement in ongoing proceedings does not result in such a loss of rights. As such, the situation was properly governed by Rule 9.3(a) RoP.
• Rule 9.3(a) RoP does not specify a particular time limit for submitting a request, which leaves room for interpretation by the LDs. The standing judge found that the Düsseldorf LD’s decision had not been “manifestly incorrect”. It had not exceeded its discretionary powers – it had taken into account all of the circumstances and it did not base its decision on false facts.

• Advanced Brain Monitoring (ABM), a US company focusing on neuro-diagnostics devices, brought an infringement action against Koninklijke Philips and related entities before The Hague LD. ABM alleged that Philips' NightBalance sleep position therapy device infringed its patent, which covered wearable systems for treating sleep disorders using position therapy. Philips filed a successful counterclaim for revocation.
• On claim construction, the court applied the Court of Appeal's principles from NanoString v 10x Genomics, confirming that the patent claim is not only the starting point, but the decisive basis for determining protective scope of the patent. The description and drawings must be used as explanatory aids for the interpretation of the patent claim and not only to resolve ambiguities. However, this does not mean that the claims serve as only a guideline and that the description and drawings are able to extend the claim beyond its wording. Here, the court construed the key claim features broadly and rejected ABM's attempts to read additional technical requirements into the claim language.
• On the basis of this broad construction, the court held that claim 1 was anticipated by embodiment 1 of a Japanese patent application and therefore lacked novelty. None of the dependent claims could render the patent valid.
• ABM had filed an auxiliary request limiting feature 1.2 of claim 1 to render the claim novel over the Japanese patent application. While it did overcome the novelty challenge, the court found that the amended claim was obvious starting from the Japanese patent application because the mercury switch used in the Japanese patent application was a hazardous substance that was prohibited in the EU from 1 July 2006 and the skilled person at the priority date would have been compelled to find an alternative. The alternative used in the amended claim was held to be well-established common general knowledge for use in wearable devices at the priority date, which rendered the amended claim obvious.
• The patent was revoked in its entirety. ABM’s infringement action was dismissed. The parties agreed a decision on costs – ABM was to pay Philips €39,000 in each the infringement action and the revocation counterclaim – which the court endorsed.

• This decision concerned a revocation action brought by TCL against Corning, an international manufacturer of specialty glass, regarding Corning’s patent concerning boroalumino silicate glass. TCL claimed invalidity on the basis of lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, insufficient disclosure and added matter
• On claim construction, the Munich CD applied the principles set out by the Court of Appeal in Nanostring v 10x Genomics and Insulet v EOFlow. In doing so, it held that the skilled person, reading the claim as a whole, would understand the various features of claim 1 to be interdependent. Based on expert evidence from both parties, the court considered it to be part of the common general knowledge that in glass systems like the one produced by the claimed method, the individual components are interdependent and the effects of adding or removing components or changing concentrations are often non-linear.
• In considering added matter, the court noted that the application as filed did not contain the exact wording of feature 1.4, but literal support is not required to satisfy Article 138(1)(c) EPC. It is sufficient if the skilled person can, directly and unambiguously, using their common general knowledge, derive the subject matter of the claim from the application as a whole. Applying this standard, all of the features of claim 1 were found to have basis in the application as filed and there was no added matter.
• On sufficiency of disclosure, the court applied the framework from the Court of Appeal in Amgen v Sanofi – is the skilled person able to reproduce the claimed subject matter on the basis of the patent without any inventive effort and without undue burden. An invention is sufficiently disclosed if the patent specification shows the skilled person at least one way – or in the case of functional features: one technical concept – of performing the claimed invention. TCL had argued that the invention was not sufficiently disclosed over the whole range of the claimed invention as the invention required a specific range in the viscosity to be performed. The court disagreed with this on the proper construction of the claim and, accordingly, found that the skilled person would be able to reproduce the claimed subject matter without any inventive effort or undue burden.
• The court confirmed the established UPC standard on novelty, citing the Court of Appeal in Mammut v Ortovox: it is decisive whether the subject-matter of the claim with all its features is directly and unambiguously disclosed in the prior art. The Munich CD found the subject matter of the patent to be novel. There was some discussion on the law relating to novelty of numerical ranges. The Munich CD found that, as a general rule, a generic disclosure does not take away the novelty of a specific (combination of) features. In this case, the skilled person would have had to make a considerable number of selections from multiple broadly defined ranges without any teaching in the prior art to justify those selections in order to arrive at the claimed subject matter. As such, there was no direct and unambiguous disclosure of the claimed subject matter in the prior art.
• On inventive step, the court followed the approach from the Court of Appeal in Amgen v Sanofi and Meril v Edwards. In this case, TCL had tried to rely on one specific example in a prior art document but did not provide a justification or explanation as to why the skilled person would proceed from that specific example in insolation. The Munich CD held that a realistic starting point is typically a prior art disclosure as a whole; the selection of a particular example merely because it comes closest to the claimed subject matter in structural terms risks introducing hindsight at the outset of the analysis. Where claim features are interdependent in providing a solution to the objective problem, dividing the objective problem into separate sub-problems and addressing each independently amounts to impermissible hindsight reasoning. The court found that none of the prior art starting points, alone or in combination, rendered the claimed subject matter obvious. The non-linear and unpredictable interdependencies within glass compositions of this type meant that the skilled person would not have arrived at the claimed solution with a reasonable expectation of success.
• The court dismissed the revocation action in its entirety. TCL was ordered to bear Corning’s legal costs.

• TRUMPF is the registered proprietor of a patent concerning an optical apparatus for combining laser light. IPG develops, manufactures and distributes fibre lasers across Europe. TRUMPF brought an infringement action against IPG, in relation to its "YLS-AMB" range of dual-beam fibre lasers. IPG counterclaimed for revocation on the basis of lack of novelty, lack of inventive step and added matter.
• The Mannheim LD found that IPG infringed the patent – the contested embodiments made direct literal use of the teaching of claim 6 of the patent. IPG's revocation counterclaim was dismissed in its entirety.
• On validity, the panel applied the Court of Appeal's established standard on added matter – as set out by the Court of Appeal in Abbott v Sibio and expert v Seoul Viosys. To determine whether there is added matter, it is necessary to ascertain what the skilled person, using their common general knowledge and viewed objectively, would immediately and unambiguously derive from the application as filed. If the patent is a divisional application, this requirement applies to each earlier application. Applying that standard, the panel found that the patent did not extend beyond the original application.
• On novelty, the Mannheim LD followed the Court of Appeal’s approach in Mammut v Ortovox – the decisive factor is whether the subject matter of the claim, with all its features, is directly and unambiguously disclosed in the prior art. Using this approach, two of the claim features were found not to be disclosed in the prior published patent application.
• In considering inventive step, the court applied the Court of Appeal's test from Amgen v Sanofi and Meril v Edwards. It found that the subject matter of the claim involved an inventive step over the primary prior art alone or in combination with other prior art documents or the common general knowledge.
• The court granted TRUMPF injunctive relief across seven UPC member states. It also made orders for recall, removal and destruction, disclosure of information, a declaration of liability for damages, and provisional damages.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• This was an action for infringement of Canon's patent relating to printer consumables against Katun and a counterclaim for revocation. The Dusseldorf LD found the patent valid and infringed and granted an injunction.
• The court also ruled on publication of the decision. Canon sought both the right to publish the decision on its own website and in industry journals of its choice, and an order under Article 80 UPCA obliging Katun to publish the operative part of the decision on their website.
• The Dusseldorf LD stated that the decision whether to permit publication by Canon should depend on a two step-test, citing the Court of Appeal's decision dated 25 November 2025 in Meril v Edwards (paragraphs 199-200). The court asked (1) whether the claimant has a legitimate interest in publication and (2) whether the defendant’s interests outweigh this. It held that both limbs favoured Canon, noting it was necessary to correct the false impression created by Katun's statements on their US website that they were confident their products did not infringe. However, the court held that there should be a restriction on the number of public media outlets in which Canon could publish the decision, agreeing to publication in five industry journals. It also held that publication on Canon's website should be restricted to one month.
• The court also made an order that Katun be required to publish the outcome on their own website, noting their statements expressing confidence that there was no infringement. The court ordered Katun to publish the operative part of the decision stating that infringement had occurred, again for a period of one month.

• In the context of an infringement action brought by Keeex, in December 2025, Adobe obtained an order for security for costs from Keeex. This security was to be given in the form of a bank guarantee from an EU-authorised bank within four weeks and totalled €200,000. Keeex appealed this order under Rule 220.1 RoP, but the appeal had no suspensive effect.
• Adobe subsequently applied for a default judgment under Rule 158.5 and Rule 355.1(a) RoP, seeking dismissal of the infringement action and its costs. It argued that Keeex had failed to provide the ordered bank guarantee within the time limit and that the documents it eventually produced did not comply with the December 2025 order or Rule 158 RoP.
• Keeex argued that default judgment is an exceptional measure that should only be handed down in the event of “manifest, persistent and culpable failure by a party, characterised by a total or deliberate refusal to comply with an order”. It relied on the fact that it (i) sought clarification from the court on the form of security, (ii) filed, within the deadline, a bank certificate showing that €200,000 had been blocked on its account, and (iii) promptly filed a “first demand” bank guarantee after receiving the judge-rapporteur’s clarifications.
• In making its decision, the Paris LD recalled that Rule 158.5 RoP provides that it may render a default judgment and, referring to the Court of Appeal’s approach in Microsoft v Suinno, emphasised the need to exercise that discretion in accordance with fairness, proportionality and procedural efficiency.
• The court held that Keeex had demonstrated sufficient diligence and that Adobe’s objections were largely formal and unsupported by evidence under Rule 271.2 RoP. As such, Adobe's application for default judgment was dismissed.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.